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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we 
investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for 
differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of 
renegotiation affects the winner’s curse effect. Using a unique dataset of 49 concessions, we 
show that the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong, i.e. bidders bid less aggressively when 
they expect more competition. In addition, we observe that this effect is larger for projects where 
the common uncertainty is greater, and is dampened in weaker institutional frameworks, in which 
renegotiations are easier. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Competition for the field, or franchise bidding, has become increasingly popular to expand 
private participation in the provision of infrastructure services. Under such auctions, the State 
or a representative (local public authorities) awards an exclusive contract to the bidder 
offering the lowest price after an ex ante competition. Since the seminal paper by Demsetz 
(1968), this policy option has been considered as a tool of government to allow private sector 
participation and benefit from efficiency advantages of competition while retaining some 
degree of control and guaranteeing the respect of community service obligations (Baldwin 
and Cave 1999, Engel et al. 2002). The fact is that in the last couple of decades, many 
countries have promulgated directives on public procurement so as to bring in competitive 
tender mechanisms, e.g. the Federal Acquisition Regulations’ mandate to use auctions in the 
U.S. public sector, the 1989 European directive on the obligation of competitive tendering, 
the 1988 Local Government Act in the United Kingdom or the 1993 “Sapin Act” in France.  
The main economic literature emphasizes that the efficiency of this awarding procedure 
depends on the number of bidders. Nevertheless, the optimal number of bidders will depend 
on the exact structure of demand and information (Athey and Haile 2007).  
According to the Walrasian analogy of markets as auctions, an increase in the number of 
bidders should encourage more aggressive bidding, so that in the limit, as the number of 
bidders becomes arbitrarily large, the auction approaches the efficient outcome. But, while 
this may be true in private value auctions3, i.e. for auctions in which a bidder’s estimate is 
affected only by his own perceptions and not by the perceptions of others, it has been shown 
that it may not be true in common-value auctions in which the competing bidders are 
differentially (but incompletely) informed about the value of the auctioned item. If bidders 
shared the same information, they would equally value the item of the auction4. A distinctive 
feature of common-value auctions is the winner’s curse, an adverse-selection problem which 
arises because the winner tends to be the bidder with the most overly-optimistic information 
concerning the value (the first formal claim of the winner’s curse was made by Capen, Clap 
and Campbell (1971), three petroleum engineers, who argue that oil companies had fallen into 
such a trap and thus suffered unexpected low profit rates in the 1960’s and 1970’s on OCS 
lease sales “year after year”). Thus, bidding naively based on one’s information would lead to 
negative expected profits, so that in equilibrium, a rational bidder internalizes the winner’s 
curse by bidding less aggressively. Bidders must then bid more conservatively the more 
                                                          
 
3 Even though Pinkse and Tan (2000) and Compte (2002) challenged this traditional view respectively in 
affiliated private-values models and in private-values models with prediction errors. 
4 Consider a bidder i of an auction who has a cost ic associated with completing the project being auctioned. 
This bidder receives a private signal ix about ic . In the pure private-value paradigm, ixc ii ∀=  (i.e. each 
bidder knows his true valuation for the object) while in the pure common-value paradigm, icci ∀= (i.e. the 
value of the object is the same to all bidders, but none of the bidders knows the true value of the object). 
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bidders there are, because winning implies a greater winner’s curse. In other words, the 
greater the level of competition, the worse the news associated with winning in a common-
value setting (Milgrom 1989, Bulow and Klemperer 2002, Hong and Shum 2002, Haile et al. 
2003, Hendricks et al. 2003).  
Thus, in common-value auctions, an increase in the number of bidders has two 
counteracting effects on equilibrium bidding behaviour. First, the increased competition leads 
to more aggressive bidding, as each potential bidder tries to maximize her chances of winning 
against more rivals: this is the competitive effect. Second, the winner’s curse becomes more 
severe as the number of potential bidders increases, and rational bidders will bid less 
aggressively in response: this is the winner’s curse effect.5 If the winner’s curse effect is large 
enough, i.e. more than compensates for the increase in competition caused by more bidders, 
prices could actually rise – in the context of procurement auctions – as the number of 
competitors increases. As a result, governments should restrict entry, or favour negotiations 
over auctions (Bulow and Klemperer 1996, Hong and Shum 2002) when the winner’s curse is 
particularly strong.  
In this paper, we empirically assess the impact of the number of bidders on bidding 
behaviour in the particular case of toll road concession contract auctions (highways, roads, 
bridges, tunnels). In these contracts, concessionaires undertake the design, building, financing 
and operation of the relevant facility and their main source of revenue are the tolls that they 
can charge to users for the whole length of the concession. While there have been some 
empirical studies on the impact of the number of bidders on prices (Bulow and Klemperer 
2002, Gomez-Lobo and Szymanski 2001, Hong and Shum 2002) or on the impact of public 
information on bidding (De Silva et al. 2005) in procurement contract auctions, there has 
been, to our knowledge, no such analysis on concession contract auctions whereas these 
auctions are special in numerous ways and should deserve a special attention.  
First, the stakes involved in such auctions are large since it has been recognised that 
infrastructure levels and quality significantly matter for economic growth and poverty 
alleviation. There are many empirical studies illustrating the impact of infrastructure on 
economic growth, among the more recent are Canning (1998), Calderon et al. (2002), 
Calderon and Serven (2002). These studies show that a 1 percent increase in the stock of 
infrastructure can increase GDP by up to 0.20 percent. In response to this and given the 
scarcity of public funds, most countries have been turning to the private sector for financing 
and operation of infrastructure services. Most often, as explained above, they award these 
services contracts via low-bid auctions, so there appears to be important efficiency and 
revenue lessons to be learned from the results.  
                                                          
5 Thus, what is called winner’s curse effect in the rest of the paper is actually the internalization of the winner’s 
curse. 
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Second, they are common-value auctions. In fact, uncertainty about future traffic – 
forecasting errors and associated risks are characteristics of infrastructure projects (Pickrell 
1990, Skamris and Flyvberg 1997, Flyvberg et al. 2002, Flyvberg et al. 2003, Odeck 2004, 
Standard & Poor’s 2004) –, the differing access to information about future states of the world 
across bidders, and their differing algorithms, lead to common values.  
Third, within the set of such auctions, projects appear to differ significantly in the level of 
common uncertainty associated with traffic forecasts. There are two main factors that can 
reduce the level of contract valuation common uncertainty: the public release of information 
about future traffic, and the length of the facility. As the theory suggests that the effects of the 
winner’s curse should be more apparent in auctions with a greater degree of common 
uncertainty (Milgrom and Weber 1982, theorem 16), these auctions permit the estimation of 
the importance of information dispersion relative to traffic uncertainty in these settings.  
Finally, but perhaps more interestingly, a particular characteristic of such auctions is that 
they are for public private contracts, which potential for renegotiation becomes to be 
highlighted for less developed countries (Guasch et al. 2003 and 2005, Guasch 2004, Laffont 
2005, Estache 2006), but also for developed countries (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, Engel 
et al. 2003, 2006a and 2006b, Athias and Saussier 2006), and clearly contributes to the 
inefficiency of PPPs. Imperfect enforcement leading to renegotiations is therefore a major 
characteristic of these contracts, which can strongly question the theoretical effects pointed 
out above. In fact, these effects stand under the classical assumption that bidders are able to 
commit with bidding promises. One obstacle to the theoretical conclusions may be the 
realization by the intelligent bidder that the contract price may later be subject to profitable 
renegotiation. This fact affects bidding behaviour in subtle ways, and may strongly question 
the two theoretical effects highlighted above (Milgrom and Weber 1982).  
  In order to consider the empirical importance of these considerations, we collected 
original data, although very difficult to obtain, on the difference between the actual traffic and 
the traffic forecast included in the winning bids, for 49 worldwide toll road concession 
contracts. Thus, we use the availability of data on ex post realizations of common traffic value 
to determine whether firms are cognizant of the winner’s curse, assuming that traffic forecast 
is a good proxy for the value of bids, and hence the ratio between traffic forecast and actual 
traffic a good proxy for bidding behaviour.  
We show that bidders bid less aggressively in toll road concession auctions when they 
expect more competition, i.e. the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong in toll road 
concession contract auctions. In addition, we find, in agreement with the theory, that the 
winner’s curse effect is stronger for shorter facilities or for projects for which the procuring 
public authority did not release its own traffic forecasts, i.e. in auctions with a greater degree 
of common uncertainty. Finally, we show that, in concession contracts, the public authority is 
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exposed to the risk that the private operator behaves opportunistically during the execution 
phase of the contract. In fact, we observe that bidders bid more strategically when they expect 
a higher likelihood of renegotiation. In other words, the perspective of later profitable 
renegotiation does question the theoretical framework.  
The policy implication of our results is not straightforward. In fact, while the traditional 
implication would be that more competition is not always desirable when the winner’s curse 
effect is particularly strong, in toll road concession contract auctions, more competition may 
be however desirable. In fact, even if the winner’s curse effect in such auctions is particularly 
strong, it reduces the systematic traffic overestimation due to methodological and behavioural 
sources. Thus, governments, whose objective function is to maximise the long-term social 
welfare, and then minimize strategic renegotiations, may wish to maintain the procedure as 
open as possible. 
We believe the contribution of our article is twofold. At the empirical level, using a unique 
dataset - the most exhaustive one on toll road concessions auctions -, we propose a test of 
auction theory. This kind of test has been quite limited by the lack of suitable data on bidding 
behaviour, as pointed out by Laffont (1997) in a survey of the empirical auctions literature. 
We also highlight the importance of the public release of contract information and the bid 
effects of uncertainty over the value of a contract, which has been largely ignored. At the 
theoretical level, we show that the perspective of later profitable renegotiation does affect 
bidding behaviour (we observe that the effect of the winner’s curse depends on the likelihood 
of renegotiation), and thus we stress the necessity to improve the theoretical framework by 
considering the transaction as a whole, i.e. considering the impact of not only the ex ante but 
also the ex post conditions on bidding behaviour.   
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the particular features of toll road 
concession auctions. To formalize the effects of an increase in competition on bidding 
behaviour in such auctions, we present in Section 3 a simple model of competitive bidding 
with common value components, and state our three theoretical propositions. Section 4 
provides a description of the data while Section 5 reports the econometric results. In Section 
6, we provide a robustness analysis of our results and Section 7 discusses the policy 
implications of our work and offers some concluding comments.  
 
2. AUCTIONS FOR TOLL ROAD CONCESSIONS 
2.1. First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions   
In this paper we study bidding behaviour in first-price, sealed bid auctions, using data on road 
concessions. In a first-price, sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently and privately picks 
a price and offers to buy the contract at that price. The one who bids the lowest price wins 
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(most of toll road concession contracts are awarded via low-bid auctions with adjudication 
criteria going from the lowest toll, to the lowest public subvention required, or to the shortest 
length of the concession).  
Concession contracts are most often awarded in two stages; in the first stage, private 
consortiums submit their technical qualifications, following the rules defined by the public 
authority. In the second stage, qualified consortiums, i.e. the consortiums selected after the 
first step, are allowed to bid. The concession is then awarded to the consortium with the best 
bid (sometimes there is an additional stage between the second stage and the selection of the 
best bid, which consists in selecting the two best bidders and asking them to submit in a third 
stage their best and final offer). Except in exceptional cases, the number of bidders qualified 
to bid is published by the public authority as a matter of transparency. It is therefore a known 
variable to the participants.  
2.2. Common Value Auctions 
Toll road concession auction environments fall in the common values category. As a matter of 
fact, the concession contract being bid for will not be fulfilled immediately and bidders have 
different information about future states of the world – e.g. market conditions or the supply 
and demand of substitute objects.  
The degree of complexity and uncertainty comes directly to bear in the design of 
infrastructure concession contracts. Forecasting errors and associated risks are characteristics 
of infrastructure projects. Studies of such errors (Trujillo et al. 2002, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, 
Flyvbjerg 2005, Standard & Poor's 2005) show that future traffic is largely overestimated, by 
large amounts. The sources of traffic forecast inaccuracy can be classified in three main 
groups. First, there is the pure uncertainty effect. Economic, social, environmental and 
technological changes can affect the assumptions, especially in the long-term, making 
forecasts uncertain by their nature. Another important source of traffic forecast errors and 
biases stems from methodological or scientific sources, including data, models and 
hypothesis. Third, there are the behavioural sources which include optimism and 
opportunism. Optimism comes from the overconfidence that analysts and project promoters 
place in the project and in themselves. Opportunism refers to the strategic manipulation of 
traffic forecasts. In fact, uncertainty in forecasts induces the possibility of manipulation that is 
exacerbated by the information asymmetries in concession projects.6  
                                                          
6 Nevertheless, although at first sight unbiased estimations should be symmetrically distributed around the zero 
error, as claimed by many authors (Quinet 1998, Standard and Poor’s 2002, Trujillo et al. 2002), the influential 
characteristic of transport forecasts makes this assumption wrong. By influential characteristic, we mean that the 
forecast itself determines whether the forecast is tested. In other words, this means that projects are not launched 
when the forecast is too low. Statistically unbiased influential forecasts should therefore appear optimistic 
because some forecasts remain untested. This effect is called the Survivor’s Curse because there are forecasts 
only for survivor projects, i.e. for projects for which there are already some positive error forecasts. Thus, while 
the bias (expected error) across all forecasts is zero, the bias for tested forecasts is positive. Survivors tend 
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In addition, bidders have access in such an environment to different information. A bidder 
might conduct her own traffic forecast survey of a toll road concession or might learn about 
market conditions from her own customers and suppliers. Furthermore, even if bidders have 
access to the same market data, they may have different algorithms or rules-of-thumb for 
using this information to form beliefs about the contract’s value. The output of one bidder’s 
algorithm (i.e. her signal) might then be useful to another bidder in assessing her own 
valuation even after seeing the output of her own algorithm (Athey and Haile 2007). In such 
cases it may be appropriate to model bidders as having different private information of a 
common values nature. 
Thus, each bidder’s traffic appraisal represents just an estimate, subject to error. No bidder 
knows what future traffic will be and each realizes that the other bidders may possess 
information or analyses that the bidder would find useful for her own traffic forecast.  
As a result, in toll road concession auctions, the winning bidder may be the one who most 
overestimate future traffic. This is all the more true that under first-price, sealed-bid auctions, 
bidders have less information on other bidders' estimates of project value.7 Thus, there is a 
greater likelihood under sealed bidding that the winner's curse will occur - that the winning 
bidder is the unfortunate one who, out of ignorance, overestimates the value of what is being 
auctioned (Milgrom and Weber 1982, Klein 1998). Bidders who would fail to take this 
selection bias into account at the bidding stage would be subject to the winner’s curse. How 
then should reasonably sophisticated bidders behave? A frequent piece of advice is: bid 
cautiously. Milgrom (1989) for example suggests that to make money in competitive bidding, 
you will need to mark up your bids twice: once to correct for the underestimation of costs – 
traffic overestimation in our case –  on the projects you win, and a second time to include a 
margin for profits. Besides, since it is reasonable to expect the selection bias to increase when 
competition gets fiercer, he adds that the mark-up to adjust for underestimation – traffic 
overestimation – will have to be larger the larger is the number of your competitors.  
2.3. Auctions with Differing Levels of Common Uncertainty  
The theory suggests that the effects of the winner’s curse (i.e. the internalization of the 
winner’s curse by bidders) should be more apparent in auctions with a greater degree of 
common uncertainty. To the extent that the magnitude of the winner’s curse decreases as the 
common uncertainty concerning the value of the auction decreases, bidders will less 
internalize the winner’s curse as the common uncertainty concerning the value of the auction 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
therefore to disappoint (Ehrman and Shugan 1995). As a consequence, the mere analysis of error’s distributions 
does not allow any inferences about the bidders’ strategy (Nunez 2007). 
7 As first demonstrated by Milgrom and Weber (1982) for symmetric common values environments, the 
information revealed publicly by losing bidders’ exits in an ascending auction reduces both the severity of the 
winner’s cruse and the informational rents obtained by the winner, leading to higher expected revenues than with 
a first-price sealed-bid auction. 
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decreases. In other words, the larger the relative size of the common-value component, the 
more cognizant of the winner’s curse bidders are expected to be when competition increases 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982, Goeree and Offerman 2003). 
There are two main factors that can reduce the level of contract valuation common 
uncertainty in the first-price, sealed bid toll road concession auctions: the public release of 
information about future traffic and the length of the facility.  
The impact of the public release of information on bidding behaviour in auctions with 
common value uncertainty begins to be studied in the experimental or empirical literature 
(Kagel and Levin 1986, De Silva et al. 2005). Such studies show that, in first-price, sealed bid 
auctions, public information reducing item valuation uncertainty can lead to more aggressive 
bidding behaviour8 and that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger 
common uncertainty.  
While the auction format for toll road concessions is quite similar across auctions, a 
feature that varies across auctions is the information provided to bidders regarding the 
procuring authority’s internal forecast of the future traffic. Some procuring authorities release 
this information prior to bidding and others do not, so the level of information dispersion 
varies across auctions in the sample. This effect is all the more important that governments’ 
negotiators juggle with multiple concerns and more general expertise than private partners 
with focused specialized negotiators and advised by deal specialists with insufficient sectoral 
and macro vision. This variation helps identify the effect of changes in information dispersion 
on bids. 
In addition, in a study of computer auctions on Ebay, Yin (2005) examines the effect of 
value dispersion and seller reputation on prices. She finds that the seller's reputation 
complements information provided in the auction descriptions by lending more credibility to 
that information. Thus, we can also expect that the level of common uncertainty also varies 
with the procuring authority’s reputation when the latter chooses to release her own traffic 
forecast.  
Another way to distinguish toll road projects regarding their common traffic uncertainty is 
to account for their differing length9. In fact, based on the preceding literature on this sector 
                                                          
8 This effect has been mitigated by Kagel and Levin (1986). They show that in presence of a winner’s curse (i.e. 
bidders do not internalise the winner’s curse), providing public information generates lower average winning 
bids and reduced seller’s revenues. To the extent that the magnitude of the winner’s curse decreases as the 
common uncertainty concerning the value of the auction decreases, public information will result in a downward 
revision in the most optimistic bidder’s valuation of the auction. They point out the fact that the differential 
response to public information conditional on the presence or absence of a winner’s curse has practical 
implications which have largely gone unrecognized in the literature.  
9 This is also a way for us to check the robustness of the results obtained with the public release of information 
criterion, since the public release of information may affect the number of bidders (if bidders base their decision 
to submit a bid on this type of information), implying that the coefficient of the PUBLICINFO variable crossed 
with the number of bidders may be biased.  
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and on discussions with some private concessionaires, we believe that there is less uncertainty 
associated with traffic forecasts of longer facilities for the following reasons: 
- large numbers law: since the number and size of zones involved (possible Origin-
Destination pairs) is much higher in long interurban facilities than in short ones, 
misspecification or error prediction on some OD’s has less impact in equilibrium;  
- short links are usually associated with dense networks where Wardrop equilibrium 
conditions (and existence) are complex (Boyce 2007); 
- if the value of travel time saving increases with the travel length (as argued by many 
authors, e.g. Hensher 1976, Brett 1999, Hensher and Greene 2003, Hensher and 
Goodwin 2004), misspecification should occur for small savings because studies on 
stated and revealed value of travel time savings usually evaluate large time savings 
(Bureau of Transport Economics 1981, Button 1993); 
- short distance travels do not follow the traditional relationship between GDP and 
mobility and are determined by life patterns. In particular, in urban transport, demand 
growth is strongly impacted by urban, land-use and transport policy (Schafer 2000). 
2.4. Renegotiation in Toll Road Concessions 
A particular characteristic of toll road concession auctions is that they are for public private 
contracts, which potential for renegotiation becomes to be highlighted for less developed 
countries (Guasch et al. 2003 and 2005, Guasch 2004, Laffont 2005, Estache 2006), but also 
for developed countries (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993, Engel et al. 2003, 2005 and 2006, 
Athias and Saussier 2006), and clearly contributes to the inefficiency of PPPs. For instance, in 
a study on more than 1,000 concession contracts awarded during the 1990s in Latin America, 
Guasch (2004) found that 53% of the concessions in the transport sector were renegotiated, 
and this took place on average only 3.1 years after the signing of the contract.  
Some renegotiation is desirable and is to be expected as contracts are in practice 
necessarily incomplete. Exogenous events that are not induced by either the government or 
the operator (like currency devaluation) can significantly affect the financial equilibrium of 
firms, and can be used as an opportunity to redistribute rents. However, the high incidence of 
renegotiations, particularly in early stages, appears to be beyond the expected or reasonable 
levels, and raises concerns about the validity of the concession model in which renegotiations 
would not be taken into account (Guasch et al. 2003). It might induce excessive opportunistic 
behavior by the operators, or by the government, in detriment to the efficiency of the process 
and overall welfare.  
Once an enterprise has been granted a concession in an infrastructure sector – and the 
eventual bidding competitors are gone – that enterprise may correspondingly be able to take 
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actions that “hold up” the government, for example through insisting on renegotiating the 
contract ex post. The inherent incompleteness of such contracts, the potential incentives for 
political incumbents to use renegotiation to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby 
increase the probability of winning an upcoming election (Engel et al. 2006b), and the 
perceived leverage of the enterprise vis à vis the government in a bilateral negotiation 
constitute powerful potential factors to seek renegotiation of the contract and secure a better 
deal than the initial one. 
Thus, when bidders expect a high likelihood of renegotiation that renders it possible to 
avoid any losses, they have strong incentives to submit bids containing promises difficult to 
satisfy, with the sole purpose of being awarded the tender (Dasgupta and Spulber 1990). 
Uncertainty in forecasts is then used in a strategic way by bidders, which is exacerbated by 
information asymmetries in concession projects. Moreover, traffic overestimation (up to the 
constraint of credibility) may represent an equilibrium in the short-term. In fact, while 
candidates submit opportunistic bids to increase their probability of success, the more 
aggressive the bids, the better it would be for the public procuring authority, since it is more 
efficient in the short-term. Moreover, financial agencies and lenders, suspecting that traffic 
forecasts are strategically increased, find a risk-sharing agreement that cushions them against 
any losses.  
This major feature of toll road concessions can strongly question the theoretical effects 
highlighted above to the extent that the bidder realizes that there is no point in internalizing 
the winner’s curse (Milgrom and Weber 1982). Thus, depending on the likelihood of 
renegotiation, bidders will more or less internalize the winner’s curse as the number of 
bidders increases.  
 
3. BIDDING FOR TOLL ROAD CONCESSION AUCTIONS: A SIMPLE MODEL 
We now present a simple model of competitive bidding that takes into account the various 
features highlighted above. 
3.1. Model Framework 
For concreteness, let assume that firms bid on lowest toll (this is not essential). We assume 
that there exists a one-to-one, decreasing, relation between the traffic forecast and the toll 
included in the bid. First, this boils down assuming that the costs (global investments and 
operation costs) are independently identically distributed – this assumption is made by 
numerous papers on PPP (e.g. Engel et al. 2007) –, and that costs underestimation cannot be 
used strategically – this seems realistic to the extent that concessionaires cannot complain ex 
post about cost underestimation since there are very few exogenous components in the cost 
estimation, and the uncertainty and information asymmetry between bidders and procuring 
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authorities regarding construction costs are low. Second, this boils down to also assume that 
rates of return are the same across firms. Again, this does not seem to be a too restrictive 
assumption since it is well-known that procuring authorities expect a range of values for the 
financial rate of return of a particular project (most often between 8% and 12%). 
Thus, the firm decides the toll it wants to bid, and then puts pressure on the forecaster so 
that she approves the traffic forecast consistent with this bid. As already discussed, it is 
possible for firms to have some margin to play around with traffic forecasts since the 
uncertainty associated with forecasts (exogenous and methodological) makes it very easy to 
manipulate the forecasts. Forecasts rely upon so many assumptions that it is usually possible 
to adjust forecasts so that they meet such demands. For instance, considering that the project 
will produce higher time savings or using higher economic growth than actually expected are 
possible ways to overestimate demand, among many others.  
In addition, in a recent survey, Nunez (2008) asked a sample of 178 forecasters whether 
they were pressured to manipulate traffic forecasts. As highlighted by Figure 1, few 
forecasters (25,6%) declare that they are scarcely or never pressured about forecast results. 
Nunez (2008) also asked them about the role and sense of strategic manipulation of forecasts. 
Figure (2) shows that for around 46% of forecasters, the strategic manipulation of forecasts 
plays either a very important or an important role in the final traffic estimations. Other 42% 
consider that the strategic manipulation plays a somewhat important role. Only 12% of them 
judged this role insignificant (i.e. even though strategic manipulation exists, they do not affect 
the final estimations in a significant way). In addition, most forecasters affirm that this 
pressure plays in the sense of traffic overestimation. This result can be seen in Figure 3. 
Figure 1: Frequency of pressure exercised on forecasters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nunez (2008) 
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Figure 2: Importance of strategic manipulations in the final estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nunez (2008) 
 
Figure 3: Sense of strategic manipulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nunez (2008) 
 
Nevertheless, bidders do not have an unbounded margin to adjust traffic forecasts. As a 
matter of fact, the margin is first bounded by credibility. Procuring authorities have an 
expectation, though inaccurate, of what the future traffic can be, so the bidder is not able to 
manipulate indefinitely traffic forecasts. Second, the margin is bounded by the other bidders’ 
tenders. Procuring authorities are able to compare the traffic forecasts of the different bidders 
and hence notice if one forecast is vastly different from the others. For instance, there was a 
case in France where one bidder was asked for a particular audition to justify her overly high 
traffic forecasts compared to the others. 
In addition, this above central assumption implies the implicit assumption that procuring 
authorities have information provided by the firms on costs, rates of return, traffic forecasts, 
so that they can check the consistency of the bid. This assumption seems to be realistic in the 
sense that, first, the financial model is most often required in the bids, second, when 
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international development banks are involved, they have the responsibility to assess the bids, 
and third procuring authorities have internal resources to check the consistency of the bids10. 
Finally, this strategic bidding behaviour also depends on the possibility for bidders to 
renegotiate the contract. As already highlighted in the previous section, there is a high 
incidence of renegotiation in toll road concessions, made mainly possible by the claim that 
actual traffic does not meet the forecasts due to a change in the exogenous factors.  
3.2. Model Setting 
 Let consider the actual traffic AD . This actual traffic is determined by nature. Each firm 
receives an estimate of this actual traffic defined as ε±= AEST DD , where ε  is i.i.d. with 
zero mean, so that bidders believe that the average of bidders’ traffic forecasts is a good 
estimate of the actual traffic (a standard assumption in common-value models: see 
Bikhchandani and Riley 1991, Albers and Harstad 1991, Krishna and Morgan 1997, 
Klemperer 1998, Bulow and Klemperer 2002, and Goeree and Offerman 2003). In addition, 
we assume that rational bidders believe that the variance of ε  is increasing in the number of 
bidders. In fact, if each bid is a random point in a certain probability distribution function, the 
variance of the sample will tend to increase concavely with the sample size – since each new 
independent observation (as in a Monte Carlo experiment) has a certain probability to 
represent a more extreme value within this PDF – and then converge to the population’s 
variance.  
Each firm chooses then a strategic traffic forecast SD  such as sDD ESTS ±= . As 
highlighted in the Section 2, the strategic bias s  depends on the number of bidders, the degree 
of common uncertainty, and the likelihood of renegotiation. So we have ),,( PRCUNbfs = , 
where NB  is the number of bidders, CU  the level of common uncertainty, and PR  the 
likelihood of renegotiation.  
Given SD , each firm chooses the toll )( SDgP =  with 0'',0' << gg . As highlighted in the 
previous section, g  is the same for each firm and given ex ante. We have then 
)),,(( PRCUNbfDgP EST ±= . 
The net present value can be written as                                                                               (1) 
where I is the initial investment and C the operation and maintenance costs.  
We suppose that the demand is inelastic (with respect to both price and quality) and, as 
already discussed, that the main strategic variable is the demand, so that costs do not matter. 
Within this framework, only the gross benefit matters, which is ∫ −= Tt rttAt dteDPB 0 ][ ,       (2) 
                                                          
10 Discussions with experts (from France, Chile and Spain) and some independent regulatory authorities (Brazil, 
Portugal) also corroborate this assumption. 
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0
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However, at the bidding stage, the demand included in the financial model is SD . Thus, 
given r and B , the only way to reduce the price (toll) included in the bid is to increase the 
traffic forecast. The probability of winning can be then written as: 
)( ijDDPP Sj
S
iwin ≠∀>=          (3) 
3.3. Number of Bidders and Traffic Forecast Deviation 
Let consider the forecast error e  be the difference between the traffic forecast included in the 
bid and the actual traffic. So we have ε±= se . The winner's forecast error can then be 
written as                                                     .                           (4) 
As the variance of ε  is increasing in the number of bidders, then                              is 
strictly increasing in the number of bidders: 0'',0'),( <>=≠∀> kkNBkijDDe SjSii . 
In addition, the probability of winning the bid for the bidder i is proportional to her own 
forecast SiD  and inversely proportional to other bidders’ forecasts    . . So we have 
)1,...,1,,()( −=≠∀=≠∀> NBjijDDhijDDP SjSiSjSi  and  
 
 
The expected forecast error is then )1,...,1,,(*)()( −=≠∀= NBjijDDhNBkeE SjSii  
Since bidders are risk-neutral, they want the expected forecast error to be constant, let say 
equal to *ie  . Thus, as the number of bidders increases, the probability of winning the bid has 
to decrease as much as the error term increases. Nevertheless, we assume that the impact of 
the increase in the number of bidders is weaker on the probability of winning than on the error 
term, i.e. the increase in the error term is not compensated by the decrease in the probability 
of winning. That is                      . This assumption seems realistic as we expect a high 
variance of traffic forecasts in our particular case due to the magnitude of traffic uncertainty. 
Thus, they have to decrease their traffic forecast to keep the expected forecast error constant. 
This is the winner’s curse effect. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The greater the number of bidders, the more likely bidders will be 
conservative to correct for traffic overestimation, i.e. the greater the effects of the winner’s 
curse. So                . 
3.4. Number of Bidders and Level of Common Uncertainty 
Let now consider the winner’s curse effect relative to the degree of common uncertainty. We 
assume that the higher the common uncertainty, the higher the variance of bids, that is                        
                             (5) 
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Thus, the winning expected forecast error is a strictly increasing, concave function of the 
common uncertaity (CU). We can then write this winning forecast error as 
 
The expected forecast error is then 
)1,...,1,,(*),()( −=≠∀= NBjijDDhCUNBkeE SjSii      (6) 
Equations (5) and (6) indicate that an increase in the common uncertainty may have two 
counteracting effects on bids. First, since the variance increases with the common uncertainty, 
the winning bid is an increasing function of the common uncertainty (Equation (5)). Second, 
to keep the expected error constant, bidders should review their bids – forecasts – downwards 
(Equation (6)). As a result, the winning bid may increase or decrease with the common 
uncertainty, depending on which of these two effects prevails.  
 
Furthermore, repeating the same exercise as in the previous section, we obtain that the higher 
the common uncertainty, the more bidders will internalise the winner’s curse as the number of 
bidders increases, i.e.                         .  
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The greater the degree of common uncertainty, the more likely bidders will 
be conservative as competition gets fiercer, i.e. the greater the effects of the winner’s 
curse. 
3.5. Number of Bidders and Renegotiation 
As already highlighted, toll road concessions observe a high incidence of renegotiation. This 
feature can impact the behaviour of bidders. They might anticipate a future renegotiation that 
will lead them to increase their expected forecast error ex ante to the limit of the outcome they 
expect of the renegotiation. In other words, some dynamic concerns are now involved in the 
bidding behaviour. 
Thus, we can write the expected forecast error in case of anticipation of renegotiation as 
following: 
                                     with                                           (7) 
where PR is the anticipated likelihood of renegotiation and )( i
R eE  is the expected forecast 
error of the winning bidder i in case of anticipation of renegotiation. The expected forecast 
error is not constant any more and as the probability of renegotiation increases, this expected 
forecast error increases, up to an upper bound, defined as:                                                                      
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Then, as the probability of renegotiation increases, an increase of the number of bidders has a 
weaker impact on the correction of traffic forecast overestimation, that is                         . 
 This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: The lower the likelihood of contract renegotiation, the more likely bidders 
will be conservative as the number of bidders increases, i.e. the greater the effects of the 
winner’s curse. 
The purpose of this paper is to test this triple prediction. In other words, we will test first 
whether, overall, bidders in such auctions are cognizant of the winner’s curse, i.e. whether 
their correction for the overestimation of future traffic is larger the larger is the number of 
bidders. Second, we will test whether bidders are more or less cognizant of the winner’s curse 
according to the projects’ differing levels of common-value components. Third, we will test 
the magnitude of the winner’s curse effect relative to the likelihood of renegotiation.  
 
4. DATA ON ROAD CONCESSION CONTRACT AUCTIONS  
We have constructed a unique dataset consisting of 49 toll road concession contract auctions 
(highways, bridges and tunnels). As illustrated by the Table 1, projects in the sample are fairly 
evenly distributed across countries. They are from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Israel, Jamaica, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, and United Kingdom. 
The oldest auctions in the sample were awarded in 1989, whereas the latest was in 2003. Most 
of data included in the database was provided by concessionaires and by regulators. Some 
others come from scientific and professional press. So far, the database that we self-
constructed is the most exhaustive one on toll road concession auctions.  
0>∂
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∂
∂
NB
D
PR
S
i
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    Table 1: Toll Road Concessions by Country and by Year 
 Year                               
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Australia             1               1 2
Brazil       1 3  1       5
Canada      1      1     2
Chile     1  1 2 1        5
France   1       1    2   4
Germany         1   1     2
Hungary       2          2
Israel            1     1
Jamaica              1   1
Portugal       1    2 2 2 2 1  10
RS11           7      7
South Africa          1       1
Thailand 1               1
UK 1  1 1    1   1   1  6
Total 2 1 1 2 1 5 6 3 3 9 6 2 5 2 1 49
 
                                                          
11 RS means Rio Grande do Sul, the Brazlian southest state. It is presented as a different country since its concessions programme as well as its regulatory regime is 
completely independent. 
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4.1. Dependent Variable: Traffic Forecast Deviation 
In settings where bidders may be subject to the winner’s curse, one often recommends that 
bidders be cautious: bidders need to correct for overestimation of future traffic and increase 
their correction on their estimate when competition gets fiercer. As already highlighted, a 
good measure for this correction is the relative discrepancy between the traffic forecast and 
the actual traffic. 
We have data on the traffic forecasts included in the bids submitted by the winning 
bidders, and on actual traffic coming from traffic counts. The average ratio between them is 
called Traffic Forecast Deviation (TFD). Thus, we define our dependent variable as 
following:  
∑−+
=
=
10
0
1 nt
tt t
t
actual
forecast
n
TFD  (8) 
 
where actualt is the actual traffic observed in year t, forecastt is the traffic forecast for the year 
t included in the bid, and n is the number of years for which we could compute this deviation. 
As data availability varies across projects, the variable TFD used in the regressions is the 
average deviation for the period for which we have both data on forecast and actual traffic. 
This period ranges up to 7 years. We take the average TFD because it captures the fact that 
bidders can manipulate either traffic forecasts at the opening of the facility or traffic growth 
forecasts, or both. 
The interpretation of this variable is straightforward: when it tends towards 1, it means that 
the traffic forecasts are very close to the actual traffic so that winning bidders submitted less 
aggressive bids; conversely, when it increases, it means that winning bidders submitted more 
aggressive bids. Thus, a positive impact on this variable implies a more aggressive bidding 
behaviour and a negative impact on this variable implies a more conservative bidding 
behaviour.  
Figure (a) in Appendix 1 gives the distribution of this TFD variable in the sample12. One 
aspect of this contractual record draws immediate attention: the prevalence of traffic 
overestimation, as highlighted by the existing literature (e.g. Skamris and Flyvbjerg 1997, 
Estache 2001), since the average deviation is 1.25, i.e. an average overestimation of 25%.  
4.2. Explanatory Variables 
The propositions to be tested formulated above suggest three main factors that are likely to 
influence the bidding behaviour: the number of bidders, the degree of common uncertainty, 
and the likelihood of contract renegotiation.  
                                                          
12 For confidentiality reasons, we are not allowed to show the distribution of the traffic forecast deviation by 
country. 
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The actual number of bidders accounts for the level of competition (it represents the 
number of bidders that actually bid after the prequalification stage). Figure b) of Appendix 1 
presents the distribution of the number of bidders in our sample. Most auctions have between 
2 and 4 bidders13. Table 2 reports that on average there were 3.9 bidders per contract, ranging 
from 1 to 9 bidders across contracts. The hypothesis is that bidders will be more conservative 
the larger is the number of bidders, i.e. we expect a negative impact of the NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS variable on our TFD variable.  
The theoretical literature in auctions suggests that the winner’s curse effect should be 
more pronounced in auctions where there is greater common uncertainty. As explained above, 
to examine the potential differences in the effect of the competition across projects, we look at 
the existence of a public release of future traffic forecast and at the length of the facilities 
being auctioned. Thus, we include in our regressions the dummy variable PUBLICINFO and 
the variable LENGTH, reflecting the length of the facility in kilometres. The prediction is that 
each of these variables, interacted with the number of bidders, will have a positive impact on 
the traffic forecast deviation.  
So as to take into account a reputation effect of the procuring authority that could 
complement the release of her own traffic forecast, we interacted the variable PUBLICINFO 
not only with the number of bidders but also with GOVLEARN variable, which reflects the 
experience of the procuring authority in awarding concession contracts.  
Regarding the likelihood of contractual renegotiation, Guasch et al. (2003) develop a 
model to accommodate renegotiations initiated by firms. This provides them with a set of 
predictions for the probabilities of renegotiation of concession contracts. They highlight the 
importance of having a regulator in place and an experimented procuring authority to limit 
renegotiations, the fragility of price caps, the relevance of economic shocks and political 
cycles, as well as the importance of good institutions (bureaucracy, rule of law, control of 
corruption) to reduce the incidence of renegotiations. Given the specificity of toll road 
concession contracts – absence of a regulator in most countries, all price-cap contracts, and 
consortiums composed most of time of both local and foreign companies – we introduced 
three variables to capture the reliability of contract enforcement. The first one, the variable 
GOVLEARN, reflects the experience of the procuring authority in awarding concession 
contracts. As a large number of prior concessions should decrease the probability of 
renegotiation (Guasch et al. 2003, Guasch 2004), we expect a negative impact of this variable 
interacted with the number of bidders variable on our dependent TFD variable.  
The second proxy for the likelihood of renegotiation is the indicator HIGH INCOME 
COUNTRY developed by the World Bank (2006). As highlighted by Laffont (2005), the 
prediction is that wealthier countries have more money to finance the functioning of the 
                                                          
13 It can be noticed here that for some auctions, only one bidder submitted a tender after the prequalification 
stage. We take into account these auctions because the tendering was competitive.  
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enforcement mechanism than poorer ones. In other words, the government’s “tolerance for 
renegotiation” depends on the investment in enforcement. This is the reason why we expect 
stronger institutional framework in wealthier countries and hence a lower probability of 
contractual renegotiation in such countries. The hypothesis is therefore that greater numbers 
of bidders for projects taking place in wealthier countries will more likely lead to more 
conservative bidding behaviour at equilibrium than in poorer ones, i.e. to a negative impact of 
the crossed variable HIC*NUMBER OF BIDDERS on our TFD dependent variable 
(highlighting a greater winner’s curse effect in wealthier countries). 
However, as discussed above, we also observe renegotiations in developed countries, even 
if it is at a lower incidence. The legal system may then serve as a useful guide for the 
probability of enforcing the agreed upon contract. There has been increased attention from 
economists and legal scholars directed to the question of what legal environments best 
promote economic growth and stability. Some have suggested that common law regimes 
outperform civil code regimes throughout the world (La Porta et al. 1998).  More specifically, 
institutional features that traditionally characterize a common law regime make it more 
difficult to renegotiate under such a legal regime than under a civil law system. The reason is 
that in civil law countries, legislation is seen as the primary source of law. By default, courts 
thus base their judgments on the provisions of codes and statutes, from which solutions in 
particular cases are to be derived. Courts thus have to reason extensively on the basis of 
general rules and principles of the code, often drawing analogies from statutory provisions to 
fill lacunae and to achieve coherence. By contrast, in the common law system, cases are the 
primary source of law, while statutes are only seen as incursions into the common law and 
thus interpreted narrowly. 
According to these features of the different legal regimes, we assume that the likelihood of 
renegotiation is higher in civil law regimes and expect therefore a lower winner’s curse effect 
in civil law countries, i.e. a positive impact of the variable CIVILLAW interacted with the 
number of bidders on our TFD dependent variable. 
The variables used in our estimations are summarized in the following Table 2 and their 
respective distribution, as well as the correlation matrix, are respectively given in Appendices 
1 and 2. 
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Table 2: Data Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition 
TFD  49 1,253 0,453 0,8 3,399 Ratio forecast traffic / actual traffic 
NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS (NB) 49 3,918 1,891 1 9 
Number of bidders for the contract, after the 
prequalification stage 
PUBLICINFO 49 0,490 0,505 0 1 1 if the procuring authority released its own traffic forecast prior to bidding; 0 otherwise 
LENGTH 49 107,089 112,997 0,5 510 Length of the facility in kilometres 
CIVIL LAW 49 0,735 0,446 0 1 1 if the country in question is under civil law regime; 0 otherwise  
HIGH INCOME 
COUNTRY 
(HIC) 
49 0,531 0,504 0 1 1 if the country in question is a high income country; 0 otherwise (Source: World Bank) 
GOVERNMENT 
LEARNING 49 2,531 3,056 0 10 
Number of concessions the public authority 
has awarded before the present project 
 
 
5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
In order to test our three theoretical predictions, we have performed log-log regressions14 (so 
as to be able to interpret the results in terms of elasticity) using OLS and Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation methods. Ten models were estimated. We first analyse the overall 
impact of the number of bidders on bidding behaviour (Model 1). We then examine the 
effects of the winner’s curse on contract auctions with differing levels of common-value 
components (Models 2 to 6). Finally, we identify, in Models 7 to 10, if the theoretical effects 
still hold when we account for the possibility for bidders to renegotiate the contract.15 Results 
are reported in Tables 3 and 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14  Only the dummy variables are not taken as logarithms in the model. 
15 As the public release of information may affect the number of bidders, we introduced the institutional 
variables only in the model with the length variable as a proxy for uncertainty, as it is truly exogenous. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimation Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
                   
number of bidders (NB) -0.220*** -0.257*** -0.261*** -0.678** -0.780*** -0.660** -0.682** -0.711*** -0.863*** -0.873*** 
  (-2.87) (-3.33) (-3.36) (-2.41) (-2.88) (-2.43) (-2.45) (-2.72) (-2.94) (-3.17) 
Publicinf*NB   0.110*     0.127**           
    (1.92)     (2.43)           
Publicinf*Govlearn*NB     0.039*    0.041**        
      (1.90)    (2.14)        
Length       -O.182** -0.201*** -0.170** -0.198** -0.238*** -0.207*** -0.257*** 
        (-2.36) (-2.73) (-2.28) (-2.58) (-3.23) (-2.71) (-3.48) 
Length*NB       0.103* 0.117* 0.089+ 0.119* 0.134** 0.113* 0.144** 
        (1.68) (1.98) (1.50) (1.93) (2.31) (1.88) (2.48) 
Govlearn*NB             -0.014+     -0.004 
              (-1.49)     (-0.36) 
HIC*NB             -0.159**   -0.138** 
              (-2.93)   (-2.16) 
Civillaw*NB                 0.131* 0.117* 
                  (1.82) (1.71) 
Constant 0.452*** 0.435*** 0.474*** 1.229*** 1.291*** 1.194*** 1.266*** 1.453*** 1.381*** 1.570*** 
  (4.37) (4.31) (4.67) (3.48) (3.84) (3.51) (3.63) (4.33) (3.90) (4.62) 
R2 0.149 0.212 0.210 0.299 0.382 0.365 0.333 0.414 0.348 0.452 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.178 0.176 0.252 0.326 0.308 0.272 0.360 0.289 0.373 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Significance levels: +0,15 * 0,10 ** 0,05 *** 0,01 
t-stat are in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
                      
number of bidders (NB)  -0.220***  -0.257***   -0.261***  -0.678***  -0.779***  -0.659***  -0.682***  -0.711***  -0.862***   -0.873*** 
   (-2.94)  (-3.09) (-3.27) (-2.89)  (-3.10)  (-3.11) (-2.52)  (-3.17)  (-3.51)  (-3.12) 
Publicinf*NB    0.110+     0.127**         
    (1.58)     (2.02)         
Publicinf*Govlearn*NB      0.039+      0.041+         
       (1.56)      (1.59)         
Length        -0.182*** -0.200***  -0.169***  -0.198***  -0.238***  -0.207***  -0.257*** 
        (-2.72)  (-2.93) (-2.76) (-2.89) (-4.08)  (-3.08) (-3.83) 
Length*NB       0.103***  0.116*  0.089+  0.119**  0.134***   0.113**  0.143** 
        (1.81) (1.89) (1.61)  (1.97)  (2.62)   (2.03) (2.39) 
Govlearn*NB              -0.013      -0.004 
               (-1.13)     (-0.26) 
HIC*NB             -0.159**   -0.138+ 
             (-2.28)  (-1.60) 
Civillaw*NB                  0.131**  0.117* 
                  (1.87) (1.74) 
Constant  0.452***   0.435***  0.474***  1.229***  1.291***  1.193***  1.266***  1.453***  1.381***   1.570*** 
  (5.22) (5.05) (5.70) (4.59) (4.53) (4.99) (4.42) (5.91) (4.95) (5.14) 
R2  0.149  0.212  0.210  0.299  0.382  0.365  0.333  0.414   0.348  0.452 
Adjusted R2  0.131   0.178  0.176  0.252  0.326  0.307  0.272  0.360  0.289  0.373 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Significance levels: +0,15 * 0,10 ** 0,05 *** 0,01 
t-stat are in parentheses. 
 
24 
The first striking result we observe is that the number of bidders is clearly an important 
variable, driving the value of bidders’ tenders. Model 1 of both estimation methods shows that 
there is a negative impact of a fiercer competition on the traffic forecast deviation variable. In 
particular, the elasticity of traffic deviation with respect to the number of bidders is about -
0.22. In other words, if the number of bidders increases from 2 to 4, the traffic forecast 
deviation variable decreases by 22%. This result corroborates our proposition 1, whatever the 
econometric model (1% significance level). It means that, overall, bidders are more 
conservative the more bidders there are, i.e. the effect of the winner’s curse in toll road 
concession contract auctions is strong. This result is consistent with the results of Hong and 
Shum (2002) who find that the effect of the winner’s curse on equilibrium bidding is 
particularly strong in highway work auctions (they find that the low bid is 11% above the 
estimate when there is one bidder, and the low bid falls to 14% below the estimate when there 
are nine or more bidders). 
We also observe that this winner’s curse effect is even larger for projects for which the 
common uncertainty is greater. In fact, the public release of information prior to bidding, 
regarding the procuring authority’s internal forecast of the future traffic, has a positive impact 
on the traffic forecast deviation variable when interacted with the number of bidders. This 
result suggests, consistent with the theory, that one way to hinder the winner’s curse effects is 
to reduce the information dispersion on the contract valuation by giving more contract 
information. This highlights the bid effects of uncertainty over the value of a contract, which 
has been largely ignored.16 Furthermore, we find that the impact of the public release of 
information on bidding behaviour is not stronger when accounting for procuring authority's 
experience, in contrast to Yin (2005).  
In the same way, we observe that, while the direct impact on the TFD variable of the 
length variable is negative – which implies that a weaker degree of common uncertainty leads 
to a forecast error reduction that more than compensates for the increase in the aggressive 
bidding behaviour (i.e. the effect captured by Equation (5) is stronger than the one captured 
by Equation (6)), the length variable interacted with the number of bidders has a positive and 
significant impact (1% significance level with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method) 
on the traffic forecast deviation (even if the direct impact of the number of bidders variable is 
negative). This means that, compared to projects for which the facility is shorter, i.e. 
compared to more uncertain projects, bidders on lengthier projects are less cognizant of the 
winner’s curse.  
                                                          
16 We also observe that the direct impact of the release of the procuring authority’s own traffic forecast on the 
TFD variable is negative (the coefficient is -0.284) but not significant. We did not introduce the direct effect of 
PUBLICINFO in our regressions because it is highly correlated with the interacted variable PUBLICINFO*NB 
BIDDERS. For this same reason, we did not introduce the direct effects of the interacted dummy variables HIC, 
CIVILLAW and GOVLEARN. 
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These results then emphasize that the larger the relative size of the common-value 
component, the more cognizant of the winner’s curse bidders are when competition increases. 
This result corroborates our proposition 2, whatever the econometric model. 
Results of Models 7 to 10 show that the effects of the winner’s curse are significantly 
higher when bidders expect a low likelihood of renegotiation. In particular, as predicted, 
Model 7 indicates that the effect of the variable GOVLEARN interacted with the number of 
bidders is negative, though almost not significant, on the TFD variable. This may corroborate 
the result of Guasch (2004) of a negative impact of the experience of the public authority on 
the probability of renegotiation. Besides, the variable CIVIL LAW interacted with the number 
of bidders is positive on the traffic forecast deviation, implying that bidders anticipate a 
higher likelihood of renegotiation in civil law countries and therefore less internalize the 
winner’s curse when bidding in such countries. This result, in contrast to what is often written 
on this topic, favours the approach which consists in relying on long concession-specific 
documents, trying to make the contract as complete as possible, i.e. trying to include every 
possible contingency to avoid leaving room for ex post renegotiations. Finally, we obtain a 
similar result when we proxy for the likelihood of renegotiation by the wealth of the 
countries. In fact, we observe a negative impact of the HIC variable when competition gets 
fiercer on the traffic forecast deviation, meaning that bidders are more cognizant of the 
winner’s curse in wealthier countries, i.e. in countries in which the probability of 
renegotiation is lower. These results are consistent with our proposition 3 and suggest that the 
effect of the winner’s curse depends on the likelihood of renegotiation, and hence stress the 
necessity to improve the theoretical framework by considering the transaction as a whole, i.e. 
considering the impact of not only the ex ante but also the ex post conditions on bidding 
behaviour.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
One shortcoming of our work is that the true number of bidders may be unobserved and/or 
endogenously determined. Porter and Zona (2003) show that bid rigging may occur in 
construction contract auction settings. This can question our results. Nevertheless, as 
explained above, the bidders in our sample of contracts have little experience. Besides, toll 
road concession contracts are long-term contracts and Chong (2007) shows that collusion is 
hardly sustainable when contracts are long-term contracts. Thus, it seems uncertain that bid 
rigging and collusion may occur in such auctions. In addition, even if some bid rigging or 
collusion exists, it tends to mitigate the winner's curse effect. Yet, we still find statistical 
evidence of the winner's curse effect. 
Much of the empirical work on auctions faces the problem of an endogenous number of 
bidders. The auction bidders who chose to bid may have been attracted by some aspect of the 
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contract being auctioned that is not captured in the other regressors or is unobservable to the 
econometrician. If this aspect is correlated with traffic forecast deviation, then we need to 
instrument for the number of bidders. Nevertheless, employing potentially weak instruments 
may not yield more accurate estimates. Besides, our dependent variable is not the bid (or the 
price) itself but traffic forecast deviation, so that the potentiality of unobservable determinants 
of traffic forecast deviation is weak.  
Nevertheless, in the following Tables 5 and 6, we introduce additional variables, not 
explicitly theoretically considered, that could potentially affect the traffic forecast deviation 
and alter the significance of our core variables. These are reputation effects, the duration of 
contract, the total construction costs, the political ideology of the public procuring authority 
and a trend variable.   
So far, we assumed that the auction setting is static whereas auctions for toll road 
concessions are repeated. We could then expect a dynamic effect on bidding behaviour (Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003). More specifically, repeated interactions render reputational 
effects important in this toll road concession setting (Athias and Saussier 2007). In fact, many 
of the concessionaires in these auctions bid on many contracts over time. The potential loss of 
future bidding eligibility may counteract concessionaires’ incentives to submit opportunistic 
bids with high traffic forecasts, anticipating renegotiation. We then introduced the dummy 
variable REPEATED as a control variable, which takes the value 1 if the procuring authority 
and the winning bidder had contracted together at least once before. 
The DURATION variable, defined as the number of months between the completion of the 
infrastructure construction and the end of the concession, captures the increasing uncertainty 
associated with long time horizons in forecasting future traffic growth. The hypothesis is that 
longer concession period increases uncertainty, leading to greater traffic growth forecast 
errors. 
The amount of investments – measured in terms of total construction costs – may affect the 
importance candidates will give to the production of a better traffic forecast and also the 
bidders’ determination to win the auction. 
It is possible that differences in political ideology (e.g. left or right leaning public 
authorities) might affect the number of bidders. In fact, private companies may show a lack of 
interest in bidding for contracts when the procuring authority is controlled by a particular 
political party (Athias and Saussier 2007). We capture this effect in the control variable 
LEFT.  
Finally, we include in the regressions a TREND variable so as to control for a temporal 
evolution of the traffic forecast practices for toll road concessions.  
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Table 5: OLS Estimation Results with Control Variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
number of bidders (NB) -0.220*** -0.257*** -0.261*** -0.678** -0.780*** -0.660** -0.682** -0.711*** -0.863*** -0.873*** -0.979*** -1.016*** 
  (-2.87) (-3.33) (-3.36) (-2.41) (-2.88) (-2.43) (-2.45) (-2.72) (-2.94) (-3.17) (-3.45) (-3 .42) 
Publicinf*NB   0.110*     0.127**               
    (1.92)     (2.43)               
Publicinf*Govlearn*NB     0.039*    0.041**            
      (1.90)    (2.14)            
Length       -O.182** -0.201*** -0.170** -0.198** -0.238*** -0.207*** -0.257*** -0.289*** -0.307*** 
        (-2.36) (-2.73) (-2.28) (-2.58) (-3.23) (-2.71) (-3.48) (-3.77) (-3.82) 
Length*NB       0.103* 0.117* 0.089+ 0.119* 0.134** 0.113* 0.144** 0.161*** 0.168** 
        (1.68) (1.98) (1.50) (1.93) (2.31) (1.88) (2.48) (2.74) (2.72) 
Govlearn*NB             -0.014+     -0.004 0.006 0.005 
              (-1.49)     (-0.36) (0.51) (0.36) 
HIC*NB             -0.159**   -0.138** -0.148** -0.143* 
              (-2.93)   (-2.16) (-2.32) (-1.72) 
Civillaw*NB                 0.131* 0.117* 0.104+ 0 .116+ 
                  (1.82) (1.71) (1.52) (1.48) 
Repeated                  -0.132+ -0.138+ 
                   (-1.47) (-1.49) 
Investment                       0.010 
                        (0.25) 
Duration                       -0.070 
                        (-0.56) 
Left                       -0.057 
                        (-0.68) 
Trend                       -0.110 
                        (-1.02) 
Constant 0.452*** 0.435*** 0.474*** 1.229*** 1.291*** 1.194*** 1.266*** 1.453*** 1.381*** 1.570*** 1.767*** 2.457*** 
  (4.37) (4.31) (4.67) (3.48) (3.84) (3.51) (3.63) (4.33) (3.90) (4.62) (4.83) (2.99) 
R2 0.149 0.212 0.210 0.299 0.382 0.365 0.333 0.414 0.348 0.452 0.476 0.499 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.178 0.176 0.252 0.326 0.308 0.272 0.360 0.289 0.373 0.386 0.351 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Significance levels: +0,15 * 0,10 ** 0,05 *** 0,01 
t-stat are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results with Control Variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
number of bidders (NB)  -0.220***  -0.257***   -0.261***  -0.678***  -0.779***  -0.659***  -0.682***  -0.711***  -0.862***   -0.873***  -0.979***  -1.015*** 
   (-2.94)  (-3.09) (-3.27) (-2.89)  (-3.10)  (-3.11) (-2.52)  (-3.17)  (-3.51)  (-3.12) (-3.41) (-3.35) 
Publicinf*NB    0.110+     0.127**            
    (1.58)     (2.02)            
Publicinf*Govlearn*NB      0.039+      0.041+             
       (1.56)      (1.59)             
Length        -0.182*** -0.200***  -0.169***  -0.198***  -0.238***  -0.207***  -0.257***  -0.289***  -0.307*** 
        (-2.72)  (-2.93) (-2.76) (-2.89) (-4.08)  (-3.08) (-3.83) (-4.19) (-4.05) 
Length*NB       0.103***  0.116*  0.089+  0.119**  0.134***   0.113**  0.143**  0.161***  0.167*** 
        (1.81) (1.89) (1.61)  (1.97)  (2.62)   (2.03) (2.39) (2.59)   (2.55) 
Govlearn*NB              -0.013      -0.004   0.006  0.005 
               (-1.13)     (-0.26)  (0.42) (0.24) 
HIC*NB             -0.159**   -0.138+   -0.148*   -0.143+ 
             (-2.28)  (-1.60) (-1.76) (-1.48) 
Civillaw*NB                  0.131**  0.117*  0.104+   0.116+ 
                  (1.87) (1.74) (1.51)  (1.50) 
Repeated                  -0.132+  -0.137 
                  (-1.55) (-1.40) 
Investment                        0.010 
                        (0.20) 
Duration                   -0.069 
                   (-0.41) 
Left                         -0.056 
                        (-0.66) 
Trend                   -0.110 
                   (-1.29) 
Constant  0.452***   0.435***  0.474***  1.229***  1.291***  1.193***  1.266***  1.453***  1.381***   1.570***  1.767***  2.456*** 
  (5.22) (5.05) (5.70) (4.59) (4.53) (4.99) (4.42) (5.91) (4.95) (5.14) (5.56) (2.57) 
R2  0.149  0.212  0.210  0.299  0.382  0.365  0.333  0.414   0.348  0.452  0.476  0.499 
Adjusted R2  0.131   0.178  0.176  0.252  0.326  0.307  0.272  0.360  0.289  0.373  0.386  0.351 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Significance levels: +0,15 * 0,10 ** 0,05 *** 0,01 
t-stat are in parentheses. 
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Model 11 of both estimation methods indicates that the results remain unaltered when 
controlling for dynamic considerations. In fact, while the variable REPEATED is weakly 
significant (15% significance level) and has a negative effect on the TFD – suggesting that 
reputational effect might play a role in such settings, HIC and CIVILLAW variables interacted 
with the number of bidders are still significant and of the expected sign (the impact of the 
legal regime is however less significant). 
Models 12 indicate that results are not affected by the introduction of all the other 
additional variables and that none of these variables is significant. Thus, including control 
variables does neither diminish the coefficient of the competition variable, uncertainty 
variables and institutional variables, nor their sign and significance.  
In addition, although our sample is not random in the sense that we only have observations 
for which all information was available (especially regarding the traffic forecast), we cannot 
characterize a sample selection bias because our observations (and the observations we do not 
have) do not follow any selection rule; i.e. the function parameters of traffic forecast deviation 
are completely independent of the parameters of the function determining the probability of 
entrance into the sample. We could however suppose that a country fixed-effect can exist 
(determined by the institutional environment for example). Unfortunately, our within-country 
samples are not sufficiently large to estimate such possible effect. 
Finally, to test the robustness of our results, it is also possible to perform some tests on the 
normality of the residuals. The line of Henry is one possibility to test the normality of the 
residuals. It connects the actual values of the residuals (Y axis) with values z built under the 
assumption that the distribution of the residuals is normal. Ideally, one must have the identity, 
i.e. all the points of the graph located on the line. Here, the result is rather satisfactory, 
although a very light skew appears with the extreme values. 
Figure 4: Line of Henry 
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The Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) tests the null hypothesis that a sample 
came from a normally distributed population. In the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, the p-
value is based on the assumption that the distribution is normal. In our case, the p-value is 
extremely large (0.93) indicating that we cannot reject that residuals are normally distributed.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has studied the impact of the number of bidders on the effectiveness of the award 
process of toll infrastructure concession contracts. We first consider what the economic 
theory says about this issue and the specificities of such auctions, leading to three 
propositions. We test these propositions using unique data gathered from a variety of sources. 
We show that the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong in toll road concession contract 
auctions. More precisely, we show that bidders bid less aggressively in toll road concession 
auctions when they expect more competition.  
We also find, in agreement with the theory, that the winner’s curse effect is even larger for 
projects for which the common uncertainty is greater. Thus, we highlight the bid effects of 
uncertainty over the value of a contract, which has been largely ignored.  
Perhaps more interestingly, we show that, in concession contracts, the public authority is 
exposed to the risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the private subject during the 
execution phase of the contract. In fact, when we interact the number of bidders variable with 
the experience of the procuring authority, or with institutional variables, proxying for the 
likelihood of renegotiation, we observe that the effect of the winner’s curse is weaker when 
the likelihood of renegotiation is higher (i.e. when the procuring authority is not experienced, 
the country is a low income country and the legal regime is a common law one). This means 
that bidders will bid more strategically in weaker institutional frameworks or in civil law 
countries, in which renegotiations are easier.  
These results point out the necessity to improve the current theoretical framework for 
procurement policy and regulation by taking into account as a primary concern the impact of 
the perspective of later profitable renegotiation on equilibrium bidding behaviour. In other 
words, our results show that the classical assumption of auction models that bidders are able 
to commit with bidding promises is not satisfied and stress the necessity to improve the 
theoretical framework by considering the transaction as a whole, i.e. considering the impact of 
not only the ex ante but also the ex post conditions on bidding behaviour. 
The policy implication of our results is not straightforward. In fact, while we show that 
asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is 
always desirable, since we find a strong winner’s curse effect in toll road concession auctions, 
we also show that there is a systematic traffic overestimation due to methodological and 
behavioural sources, so that in most cases bidders would know ex post very low or negative 
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profit rates if they do not renegotiate the contractual terms. Thus, the short-term policy 
implication of our results would fit the standard view: governments should restrict entry, or 
favour negotiations over auctions, in toll road concession auctions to favour aggressive 
bidding. By contrast, the long-term policy implication of our results is that governments may 
wish to maintain the procedure as open as possible to the extent that the winner’s curse effect 
reduces the systematic traffic overestimation and then reduces the likelihood that the 
procuring authority will have to renegotiate the contract, once eventual bidding competitors 
are gone.  
In addition, we find that bidders less internalize the winner’s curse when procuring 
authorities release publicly their own traffic forecast prior to bidding. Thus, procuring 
authorities interested in reducing the winner’s curse effect should consider releasing contract 
information that may reduce information dispersion in these toll road auction settings.  
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  Appendix 1: Histograms for the regression variables 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix 
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BIDDERS 
GOVLEARN* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
HIC* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
CIVILLAW* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
REPEATED LOG INVEST
LOG 
DURATION LEFT 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 1.0000           
LOG LENGTH -0.0063 1.0000          
LOG LENGTH* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
0.7425 0.6361 1.0000         
PUBLICINFO* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
0,2462 0,0429 0,1936 1.0000        
GOVLEARN* 
LOG NB 
BIDDERS 
0.5364 0.0860 0.4844 -0,2557 1.0000       
HIC* LOG NB 
BIDDERS 0.4522 -0.2655 0.1976 -0,5132 0.6038 1.0000      
CIVILLAW* LOG 
NB BIDDERS 0.7215 0.2023 0.6565 0,2330 0.4486 0.2104 1.0000     
REPEATED 0.0221 -0.2264 -0.0749 -0,2556 0.5039 0.3174 -0.0712 1.0000    
LOG INVEST 0.1368  0.1463 0.2455 -0,3422 0.2401 0.5110 -0.0101 0.2145 1.0000   
LOG DURATION 0.1422 -0.2657 -0.0320 -0,3144 0.2862 0.5204 -0.1497 0.3007 0.5181 1.0000  
LEFT 0.2357   -0.0399   0.1661   -0.3254 0.4524    0.4015    0.2875    0.2754    0.0951   0.2802 1.0000 
 
